As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains such as healthcare, understanding their moral reasoning becomes essential. Decisions about scarce medical resources often hinge on judgments of responsibility, particularly when patients' own actions contribute to illness.

We investigate how LLMs reason about responsibility and its consequences, tracing their judgments across successive levels, from the behavior, to the resulting illness, to the denial of care. We evaluate a wide range of LLMs, spanning different model families and capability levels, on various clinical vignettes adapted from prior studies.

Our results identify a judgment-consequence gap: LLMs largely agree with humans that patients bear responsibility for health-harming behaviors, yet overwhelmingly refuse to let that judgment influence how they allocate scarce resources. Specifically, LLMs default to random allocation, whereas humans consistently favor the less-culpable patient.

Compared to humans, LLMs also place greater emphasis on access to information, reducing responsibility judgments when health-risk knowledge is unavailable. These findings reveal that LLMs apply a systematically different moral framework than humans when responsibility and resource scarcity intersect, surprisingly often amplifying normative disagreement with humans as reasoning capability increases.