Gradient matching attacks (GMAs) in LLM split learning (SL) rely on a critical yet underexplored assumption: the gradient exposed at the split interface is a faithful derivative of the client's full-label training objective. This gradient-objective consistency allows a curious server to recover private labels by searching for a sequence whose induced gradient explains the observation.

We propose Gradient Mirage, a defense that breaks this consistency without discarding the optimization utility of the backward signal. Our key idea is to induce the adversary to solve a misspecified inverse problem, in which no plausible label sequence in the sequence space can explain the observed gradients.

Concretely, Gradient Mirage achieves this by inducing inconsistency across three dimensions: objective, direction, and scale. Selective Autoregressive Supervision derives the exposed gradient from a masked surrogate loss rather than the full-label objective assumed by the attacker; Scale Blinding then applies randomized multiplicative rescaling, obscuring the gradient's natural magnitude; and Directional Privatization further randomizes the gradient direction while preserving its magnitude through the von Mises-Fisher (vMF) mechanism under a directional metric differential privacy guarantee.

Crucially, utility is preserved: the Top segment still learns from all target tokens via Dual-Track Backpropagation, the exposed gradient remains informative since each supervised token retains its complete autoregressive context, and Bottom-Gradient Recovery restores the effective gradient for Bottom-segment optimization. Extensive experiments show that Gradient Mirage provides substantially stronger protection than existing defenses under comparable fine-tuning performance, achieving a better privacy-utility trade-off.